


Server authentication:



The server should:

- authenticate:

- ~~make~~ the establish the master session key for encryption and message auth.

The server uses asymmetric crypto:

- DH for key establishment

- signatures: server signs the half of DH.

The (verification) public key must be binded to server's identity

- certificate to used for that purpose

The cert. contains at least:


- Obs Certificate
- the name of the issuer
 - the name of the subject
 - validity period,
 - public key description
 - information about the purpose of the public key:
 - for signature?
 - for encryption?
 - for certificate issuance?
 - description of the signature algorithm used to sign the certificate,

• the signature under the certificate

Why the client trusts in the certificate?

- self signed certs do not scale well.


So we distinguish separate entities:
 Certification Authorities



If the client trusts CA then
 it trusts in the cert. issued by CA.


- It trusts :- distinguished name of the CA
- knows the verification key to verify cert. issued by CA,
- knows the signature algorithm.

*bsCat.




This is not enough for real application.

We need a deeper hierarchy:



So the server provides certificate chain:

Root CA, Cert Int CA₁, Cert Int CA₂,
Cert Int CA₃, Cert EE



On one side we have the infrastructure of CAS
on the other the certificate chain just reflects the hierarchy.

we transfer trust from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy.


Things are not so simple:

in the certificate we have

Validity field:

Not Before

Not After




CA 7 months



when the validity period of the "superior" key is shorter than for issued certs,

the CA must request a new certificate in the supervising CA, to get a new certificate with long validity period:



So we may follow key identifiers (together with DN of the subjects and issues to build the correct chain of certificates).

