


DNS - cache poisoning



Anti-force: many answers

If the attacker will correctly guess the address of the requested DNS server, UDP port, and ID of request and will be quicker than the genuine server then the cache will be poison.

DNS Sec

First version in 1997.

DNS Sec introduces PKI into DNS and signatures that authenticate Resource Records.

So DNS Sec adds a few new DNS record types:

RRSig - for signatures

DNSKey - contains public key for signature verification

DS - contains a hash of a DNSKey record.

NSEC and NSEC3 - denial of existence of a DNS record.



DNKEY, CDS - they are used for child zone updates.

First step is to group Resource Records having the same name and type

www.example.com A 172.16.4.17
A 172.16.4.20


So such resource records are grouped into sets (RRset) and one signed with ZSK (Zone Signing Key).



To make the signature verifiable the zone operator also publishes ZSK in the DNSKEY record.

How ZSK is authenticated?

The KSK is used for that purpose



KSK is used only for signing ZSKs,

ZSK is used for signing everything else (RRsets)



This distinction allows to make frequent changes of ZSK → KSK

↳ linked to the parent ZONE,

DS record in the parent zone contains a hash of the RSK (see key tag - Sect. 5.1 of RFC 4034)

So we build a hierarchy.

key value name and algorithm



NSEC - , NSEC3
(next secure) - a proof that there is no entry like e.g. ::
But ^{a a. priv. edu. wroc.pl} ~~was~~ allows ~~for~~ resource records enumeration:
↳ priv. priv. edu. wroc.pl
such a record can be returned by NSEC, but this subdomain is intended to remain private.
NSEC3 replaces NSEC and uses hashes.

Unfortunately, DNSSec is not widely deployed: in 2017 30% TLD and 47% country code TLDs (ccTLDs) were DNSSec enabled.

Moreover, there are some issues with resolvers:

if ~~new~~ unsupported algorithms are listed in signed DNS responses (even if a domain supports multiple algorithms and only some of which are unknown to the resolver) the resolvers do not validate DNSSec - this opens doors to cache poisoning attacks.